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Introduction
In this article, I will suggest that the courts should use a contextual framework that also reflects certain universal principles, such as the antidisadvantage principle, to interpret section 1 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.' I will reject the dichotomy between contextual and universal considerations; instead, I will argue that the courts' decisions can (and should) reflect both contextual and universal considerations, with the appropriate universal consideration being the anti-disadvantage principle.
In analysing Charter cases, the courts at present use a two-step process that has some (but not enough) contextual elements and some (but not enough) consideration of the anti-disadvantage principle. First, the courts determine whether a plaintiff has established an infringement of a substantive Charter right; and, second, if the plaintiff meets that burden of proof, they determine whether the defendant (usually a branch of government) can justify the infringement. The second step proceeds under section 1 of the Charter and is the focus of this article. The existing framework, I will argue, as represented by R v. Oakes,2 has some (but not enough) contextual elements; it also does not reflect the anti-disadvantage principle. The modified Oakes framework that was articulated by former Chief Justice Dickson in Attorney-General of Quebec v. Irwin Toy is also insufficiently contextual but has begun to reflect the anti-disadvantage principle. If the courts were to recognize that they do not have to choose between contextual and universal principles, I believe that they could begin to incorporate and expand the useful contextual and universal aspects of Oakes and Irwin Toy. Such recognition has occurred in the recently decided case R. v. Keegstra.4
In the first few years of Charter interpretation, some commentators criticized the Supreme Court's section 1 approach for not reflecting the language of the section,5 for being too activist,6 or for not reflecting a sufficiently unified conception of the Charter.7 More recently Justices Dickson and Wilson have argued that the courts' decisions should be more contextual,8 whereas various commentators have argued that the courts' decisions should be more abstract (or striving towards universal truths).9 I will not argue for or against judicial activism as a theoretical matter. Instead, I will search for both a unified and contextual understanding of the Charter that can help judges determine whether to be activist on a case-by-case basis.
This article will focus largely on the contributions made to Canadian jurisprudence by Justices Dickson and Wilson, because some aspects of their frameworks are compatible with my proposed framework. The article does not purport to survey all of Canadian constitutional jurisprudence; that would be an impossible task. Due to the retirements of both Dickson and Wilson, as well as their important contributions to the Court, it seems appropriate to focus on their contributions at this time.
DEFINITIONS

Contextualizing
Before discussing various Charter frameworks, I will define what I mean by contextualizing and the 'anti-disadvantage principle.' The importance of contextual analyses is a central feature of both critical and feminist theory.'? The need for contextual analyses flows from two related observations within feminist and critical theory.
First, these theorists recognize that we each come to an inquiry from our own subjective perspective.1 It is wrong to claim that a perspective is universally shared or objective. Thus, in order to understand an issue, one must try to grasp its specific meanings for a wide variety of people, by listening closely to how they describe the issue's impact on their lives.'2 When we try to speak at too great a level of generality, we often fail to account for the multiple perspectives that exist on a particular issue by falsely assuming that our particular perspective is reflective of everyone's experience. For example, instead of asking how abortion restrictions affect all women, a contextual perspective would advise us to recognize the I will not argue for or against judicial activism as a theoretical matter. Instead, I will search for both a unified and contextual understanding of the Charter that can help judges determine whether to be activist on a case-by-case basis.
DEFINITIONS
Contextualizing
First, these theorists recognize that we each come to an inquiry from our own subjective perspective.1 It is wrong to claim that a perspective is universally shared or objective. Thus, in order to understand an issue, one must try to grasp its specific meanings for a wide variety of people, by listening closely to how they describe the issue's impact on their lives.'2 When we try to speak at too great a level of generality, we often fail to account for the multiple perspectives that exist on a particular issue by falsely assuming that our particular perspective is reflective of everyone's experience. For example, instead of asking how abortion restrictions affect all women, a contextual perspective would advise us to recognize the varieties of ways that abortion regulations affect various subcategories of women.'3 The unit of analysis would be smaller than 'all women,' and the perspectives for which we would account would be diverse.
Before her retirement Justice Wilson appeared to incorporate this contextual observation into her opinions. In Edmonton Journal v. AttorneyGeneralfor Alberta, she observed that the challenged statute (which forbade publication of judicial proceedings regarding matrimonial relations) 'does not impact uniformly on all litigants in matrimonial disputes but more particularly on some.'14 She took an important step in recognizing the non-universal impact of the statute on the group that it was designed to protect. The step, however, that Wilson did not take was to determine what is the legal significance of that non-uniformity. As I will argue in the next section, she needed to make reference to a universal principle, such as the anti-disadvantage principle, to answer that question. 15 Second, we must be cautious in trying to define broad injuries, rights, or freedoms. For example, we need to be careful not to try to speak abstractly about whether 'freedom of expression' or 'life' should be protected by the Charter. We need to understand the specific context in which the claim has arisen in order to determine how seriously to take that claim. We would therefore find it difficult to answer the question whether the Charter should protect 'freedom of expression' or 'life.' We would have to say, 'It depends,' because we would need to know the context in which the question arose in order to answer the question.
Justice Wilson also applied this second principle in Edmonton Journal, although in a section 2 rather than a section 1 analysis.16 She defined the constitutional importance of freedom of expression, for section 2 purposes, within the context of how the constitutional issue arose. She therefore spoke about freedom of expression in terms of an open court process; 13 For an example of this approach, see Ruth Colker 'An Equal Protection Analysis of United States Reproductive Health Policy: Gender, Race, Age, and Class' (1991) Duke LJ 324. 14 (1989) 64 DLR (4th) 577 at 591 15 One reason for suggesting that Wilson did not develop an adequate framework to apply her contextual observation was that she lacked a universal standard by which to judge the contextual result. Under my proposed analysis, if the Court adopted the universal standard embodied in the anti-disadvantage principle along with a contextual analysis, then it could note that the group most likely to receive protection under the Edmonton statute -public figures -was not likely to be a disadvantaged group. Thus, the observation that one subgroup -public figures -is most likely to be protected by the statute and that the subgroup is not one that has been historically disadvantaged would have made it easier for the Court to justify overturning the statute. It would be clearer that the statute infringed a section 2 right without sufficient justification. 16 Supra note 14, 582 varieties of ways that abortion regulations affect various subcategories of women.'3 The unit of analysis would be smaller than 'all women,' and the perspectives for which we would account would be diverse.
Justice Wilson also applied this second principle in Edmonton Journal, although in a section 2 rather than a section 1 analysis.16 She defined the constitutional importance of freedom of expression, for section 2 purposes, within the context of how the constitutional issue arose. She therefore spoke about freedom of expression in terms of an open court process; 13 For an example of this approach, see Ruth Colker 'An Equal Protection Analysis of United States Reproductive Health Policy: Gender, Race, Age, and Class' (1991) Duke LJ 324. 14 (1989) 64 DLR (4th) 577 at 591 15 One reason for suggesting that Wilson did not develop an adequate framework to apply her contextual observation was that she lacked a universal standard by which to judge the contextual result. Under my proposed analysis, if the Court adopted the universal standard embodied in the anti-disadvantage principle along with a contextual analysis, then it could note that the group most likely to receive protection under the Edmonton statute -public figures -was not likely to be a disadvantaged group. Thus, the observation that one subgroup -public figures -is most likely to be protected by the statute and that the subgroup is not one that has been historically disadvantaged would have made it easier for the Court to justify overturning the statute. It would be clearer that the statute infringed a section 2 right without sufficient justification. 16 Supra note 14, 582 whereas Justice Cory, who did not use a contextual analysis, speaks about freedom of expression more abstractly. 17 This appreciation of multiple perspectives would result in the courts treating the plaintiff's claim of an alleged infringement of Charter rights with the fullest possible respect.18 Two modifications to the Court's present framework would occur, corresponding to the two observations made above. First, rather than ask what governmental interests are sufficiently important to the government in order to justify an infringement of a substantive right, a contextual approach would try to understand what kinds of justifications are legitimate in the light of the distinctive nature of the right being infringed; and, second, it would assess the legitimacy of the justification for the infringement from the perspective of the plaintiff, the group purported to be protected by the legislature, society at large, and the government. Under a contextual approach, the same argument could justify the infringement of one substantive right but not another one. This interactive and multiple-perspectives approach, I believe, would be more protective of the core nature of a substantive right and its relationship to a wide variety of actors in society than would a non-interactive and singleperspective approach that tries to assess the importance of a justificatory argument apart from consideration of the nature of the substantive rights and the significance of the justification for the limitation to the plaintiff.
In this article, I will elaborate further on this proposed section 1 analysis, showing how it would clarify many of the Court's recent decisions and, in some cases, possibly change the result. Although the framework that I am suggesting has not been a formal part of any of the Court's decisions, I believe it does represent the views often expressed by many members of the Court, particularly Dickson and Wilson.
The need for universal principles The framework that I have sketched above would reflect a contextual perspective. Although it is not the exact framework that has been suggested by judges or commentators, such as Wilson, I believe that it might meet with their general approval. However, as I stated at the outset, I am not satisfied with an entirely contextual approach, because it does not sufficiently try to embody some minimal, universal values.
An entirely contextual (that is, non-objective) approach is popular within whereas Justice Cory, who did not use a contextual analysis, speaks about freedom of expression more abstractly.17 This appreciation of multiple perspectives would result in the courts treating the plaintiff's claim of an alleged infringement of Charter rights with the fullest possible respect.18 Two modifications to the Court's present framework would occur, corresponding to the two observations made above. First, rather than ask what governmental interests are sufficiently important to the government in order to justify an infringement of a substantive right, a contextual approach would try to understand what kinds of justifications are legitimate in the light of the distinctive nature of the right being infringed; and, second, it would assess the legitimacy of the justification for the infringement from the perspective of the plaintiff, the group purported to be protected by the legislature, society at large, and the government. Under a contextual approach, the same argument could justify the infringement of one substantive right but not another one. This interactive and multiple-perspectives approach, I believe, would be more protective of the core nature of a substantive right and its relationship to a wide variety of actors in society than would a non-interactive and singleperspective approach that tries to assess the importance of a justificatory argument apart from consideration of the nature of the substantive rights and the significance of the justification for the limitation to the plaintiff.
An entirely contextual (that is, non-objective) approach is popular within feminist theory. Some feminists argue that a general critique of objectivity flows from the feminist critique of one form of objectivity -that of sexual objectification. Catharine MacKinnon best represents this perspective and describes it succinctly:
The male epistemological stance, which corresponds to the world it creates, is objectivity: the ostensibly noninvolved stance, the view from a distance and from no particular perspective, apparently transparent to its reality. ... Woman through male eyes is sex object, that by which mans knows himself at once and as subject.19
Although I generally agree with the feminist critique of the problem of sexual objectification, I do not agree that this critique forces us to abandon our aspirations for objective or universal norms. It is true that when judges have purported to speak from an objective perspective, they have often relied on the norms of a white, male, heterosexual, Christian, able-bodied society. That fact, however, should not cause us to abandon entirely our search for universal, ethical principles, especially because it is not possible to avoid embedding our work in some ethical principles. If we have no ethical principles then we have no basis for judging what types of changes might move us, as a society, in a better direction. Irrespective of whether we propose procedural or substantive modifications to the Court's existing framework, we need to have a basis upon which to judge the appropriateness of those modifications and ultimately to measure whether those changes, if incorporated, achieve our desired results. Thus, rather than pretend that we can proceed without reliance on any universal or objective principles, I try to develop those principles as minimally and carefully as possible.
In devising such principles, we have the obligation to choose principles that we believe will best help the society in which we live while also moving cautiously in devising such principles. The male epistemological stance, which corresponds to the world it creates, is objectivity: the ostensibly noninvolved stance, the view from a distance and from no particular perspective, apparently transparent to its reality. ... Woman through male eyes is sex object, that by which mans knows himself at once and as subject.19
In devising such principles, we have the obligation to choose principles that we believe will best help the society in which we live while also moving cautiously in devising such principles. Section 1 comes into the analysis when the courts have already concluded that a substantive infringement of a Charter right has occurred. The question under section 1 is whether the court should also conclude that the legislation or policy should be struck down as unconstitutional. The burden of proof is on the government to show that the statute is not unconstitutional.22 In other words, the premise underlying the section 1 analysis is that the statute should be found to be unconstitutional unless the government can demonstrate otherwise. That is, at root, an undemocratic assumption. The interpretative question for the courts is what principles should guide the evaluation of whether that presumption should be overturned. Thus, the reference to democracy in section 1 may be seen as a reminder to the courts to respect the wisdom of the legislature and not to be too activist;23 however, the reference to democracy does not easily resolve the issue of which values the courts should use when they choose not to defer to the legislative judgment.
Along with the primacy of democracy, I believe that the Charter recognizes the importance of the anti-disadvantage principle. The anti-21 See, for example, Cameron 'The Original Conception' supra note 9, 262 (noting the special character of parliamentary democracy that underlies the Charter). 22 The text of section 1 actually does not compel this allocation of the burden of proof, because it speaks in the passive voice. Either the plaintiff or the defendant could have been given the burden of proof to demonstrate the reasonableness of an infringement. The reference to democracy, in fact, could have been used as ajustification for imposing the burden of proof on the plaintiff rather than on the government-defendant. All the justices on the Court, however, seem to have concluded that the appropriate burden of proof under section 1 is on the government. 23 Robin Elliot makes this argument; see supra note 6.
should not assume that they are numerous, wide-ranging, or even constant over time. The feminist critique of objectification should make us acutely aware of how difficult it is to generalize. In addition, the limited nature of good faith dialogue should caution us against expecting ourselves to be able to attain universal principles easily. Thus, in this essay, I am seeking to develop only one universal principle for Charter interpretation -the anti-disadvantage principle.
The anti-disadvantage principle Commentators have attempted to identify universal principles that underlie section 1 of the Charter. The most frequently articulated principle is the protection of democracy, since section 1 explicitly refers to 'free and democratic societ [ies] .'21 Nevertheless, I contend that the reference to democracy, although instructive, does not sufficiently inform the courts about which values to embody in section 1 adjudication.
Section 1 comes into the analysis when the courts have already concluded that a substantive infringement of a Charter right has occurred. The question under section 1 is whether the court should also conclude that the legislation or policy should be struck down as unconstitutional. The burden of proof is on the government to show that the statute is not unconstitutional.22 In other words, the premise underlying the section 1 analysis is that the statute should be found to be unconstitutional unless the government can demonstrate otherwise. That is, at root, an undemocratic assumption. The interpretative question for the courts is what principles should guide the evaluation of whether that presumption should be overturned. Thus, the reference to democracy in section 1 may be seen as a reminder to the courts to respect the wisdom of the legislature and not to be too activist;23 however, the reference to democracy does not easily resolve the issue of which values the courts should use when they choose not to defer to the legislative judgment.
Along with the primacy of democracy, I believe that the Charter recognizes the importance of the anti-disadvantage principle. The anti-21 See, for example, Cameron 'The Original Conception' supra note 9, 262 (noting the special character of parliamentary democracy that underlies the Charter). 22 The text of section 1 actually does not compel this allocation of the burden of proof, because it speaks in the passive voice. Either the plaintiff or the defendant could have been given the burden of proof to demonstrate the reasonableness of an infringement. The reference to democracy, in fact, could have been used as ajustification for imposing the burden of proof on the plaintiff rather than on the government-defendant. All the justices on the Court, however, seem to have concluded that the appropriate burden of proof under section 1 is on the government. 23 Robin Elliot makes this argument; see supra note 6. disadvantage principle is democratic, rather than anti-democratic, because it helps to ensure that democracy works effectively. It helps groups attain political and economic power so that they can be taken seriously in the political marketplace.
The anti-disadvantage principle, which was articulated by former Chief Justice Dickson in Irwin Toy24 for section 1 analysis and by Justice McIntyre in Law Society of British Columbia v. Andrews25 for substantive section 15 analysis, lies at the heart of a wide range of people's understandings of the Charter.26 The language of the Charter, with its special reference to disadvantaged groups in section 15, as well as its attention to minority language rights and minority language educational rights, supports this principle.
The anti-disadvantage principle is also distinctively Canadian, because it fits well with parliamentary democracy by trying to reconcile individual and community rights. As Jamie Cameron has explained, the United States Constitution is premised on the idea that 'individual rights are entitlements which are imperative against the state as a matter of supreme law.'27 The Charter, by contrast, as an extension of Canadian parliamentary democracy, 'recognizes that individual autonomy and social values will conflict, but contemplates their reconciliation on a pragmatic, ad hoc basis.'28 Justice McLachlin seems to agree with Cameron's description of the distinctive nature of Canadian society. She has described this distinctive aspect in a recent article: Canada, as a western democracy, has a strong tradition of liberalism. But it has other traditions too, traditions which distinguish its society markedly from that of the United States ... [T]he individual is seen as a member of the community and the state is viewed as an agency which mediates between the interests of various groups within society, and by which the goals of the collectivity are advanced. Another Canadian tradition which finds no counterpart in the United States is our concept of multiculturalism. We have long embraced, and our Charter expressly guarantees, the equal status of the French and English languages, with all its Lesbians, by contrast, are more likely to be treated adversely due to a genuine dislike or moral disapproval of their lifestyles; their childbearing capacity is generally unacknowledged by heterosexual society.34 In both cases, the perspective of the dominant majority operates to limit the opportunities of the groups acted upon, and thereby creates disadvantages, although the values accounting for the stereotypes may differ.
The concept of disadvantage, however, includes more than momentary expressions of stereotypes. It also includes a historical perspective that acknowledges that certain groups have faced disadvantageous stereotypes over a period of years, which have operated to exclude them from real power in society. Thus, some people might argue that heterosexual, white, middle-class men face certain stereotypes about their inability to express their feelings, or perform certain 'feminine' tasks; however, those stereotypes do not result in their being systematically excluded from power in society. In fact, those stereotypes may reinforce their power in society by making them seem like more capable leaders of industry or government.
Finally, the concept of disadvantage is a group-based concept that recognizes that people are acted upon in a stereotypical way based on the actor's perception of them as falling within a particular group. The categorization may not be accurate, as when, for example, an individual perceives a gay man to be physically handicapped because the individual assumes that the gay man has AIDS. Nevertheless, the characterization operates to limit the opportunities of the person who is perceived to be disadvantaged.
The anti-disadvantage principle is predicated on the assumption that the courts have the responsibility to ensure that the legislative process fully protects the needs and interests of disadvantaged groups. Disadvantaged groups need judicial protection because they cannot always expect to get that protection from the majority-controlled legislatures. In addition, privileged groups can more readily afford to survive without that judicial protection, because they have the economic resources to minimize the adverse consequences of substantive infringements. For example, a statute that creates geographical inequities in the availability of abortions will be 34 Thus, lesbians have difficulty in finding a clinic that will assist them with artificial insemination, whereas heterosexual, married women are encouraged to seek medical assistance when they are experiencing difficulties getting pregnant. Finally, the concept of disadvantage is a group-based concept that recognizes that people are acted upon in a stereotypical way based on the actor's perception of them as falling within a particular group. The categorization may not be accurate, as when, for example, an individual perceives a gay man to be physically handicapped because the individual assumes that the gay man has AIDS. Nevertheless, the characterization operates to limit the opportunities of the person who is perceived to be disadvantaged.
The anti-disadvantage principle is predicated on the assumption that the courts have the responsibility to ensure that the legislative process fully protects the needs and interests of disadvantaged groups. Disadvantaged groups need judicial protection because they cannot always expect to get that protection from the majority-controlled legislatures. In addition, privileged groups can more readily afford to survive without that judicial protection, because they have the economic resources to minimize the adverse consequences of substantive infringements. For example, a statute that creates geographical inequities in the availability of abortions will be 34 Thus, lesbians have difficulty in finding a clinic that will assist them with artificial insemination, whereas heterosexual, married women are encouraged to seek medical assistance when they are experiencing difficulties getting pregnant. more problematic to disadvantaged women who do not have the economic resources to overcome those geographical obstacles than to middle-class women with more economic resources. In considering the constitutionality of such a statute, it is thus extremely important to keep in mind its impact on the most disadvantaged groups in society.35 Nevertheless, I must acknowledge that I have some misgivings about the term 'disadvantage.' I wonder if the Canadian tendency to refer to 'disadvantage' rather than 'subordination' is a method of understating the scope of discrimination in society.36 In addition, the term 'disadvantage' may suggest that the individuals who are being treated unfairly are, in some way, responsible for this unfair treatment through handicapping traits that they possess. The term 'subordination' may indicate more clearly that discrimination is caused by other people's negative perceptions of certain groups in society rather than by any inherent characteristics of the subordinated groups. Despite my misgivings about the term 'disadvantage,' I have retained it in this article since it appears to be a well-accepted term in Canadian society. I have tried to define the term clearly so that it will not suffer from these inappropriate characterizations.
COMPARISON WITH OTHER FRAMEWORKS
Using these definitions, I will examine three justificatory frameworks that could be applied to section 1: (1) a relatively non-contextual approach, which is reflected in the Oakes test and which does not reflect the antidisadvantage principle; (2) a relatively contextual approach, which has been developed in the United States but which does not reflect the antidisadvantage principle, and (3) more problematic to disadvantaged women who do not have the economic resources to overcome those geographical obstacles than to middle-class women with more economic resources. In considering the constitutionality of such a statute, it is thus extremely important to keep in mind its impact on the most disadvantaged groups in society.35 Nevertheless, I must acknowledge that I have some misgivings about the term 'disadvantage.' I wonder if the Canadian tendency to refer to 'disadvantage' rather than 'subordination' is a method of understating the scope of discrimination in society.36 In addition, the term 'disadvantage' may suggest that the individuals who are being treated unfairly are, in some way, responsible for this unfair treatment through handicapping traits that they possess. The term 'subordination' may indicate more clearly that discrimination is caused by other people's negative perceptions of certain groups in society rather than by any inherent characteristics of the subordinated groups. Despite my misgivings about the term 'disadvantage,' I have retained it in this article since it appears to be a well-accepted term in Canadian society. I have tried to define the term clearly so that it will not suffer from these inappropriate characterizations.
Using these definitions, I will examine three justificatory frameworks that could be applied to section 1: (1) a relatively non-contextual approach, which is reflected in the Oakes test and which does not reflect the antidisadvantage principle; (2) a relatively contextual approach, which has been developed in the United States but which does not reflect the antidisadvantage principle, and (3) the extent to which a legal framework is contextual is the most (or only) appropriate consideration in assessing the appropriateness of a legal framework, I will suggest that contextuality, alone, will not provide sufficient protection for individual rights and freedoms. Effective protection of these rights requires both a contextual framework and a framework that reflects the anti-disadvantage principle.
In the extent to which a legal framework is contextual is the most (or only) appropriate consideration in assessing the appropriateness of a legal framework, I will suggest that contextuality, alone, will not provide sufficient protection for individual rights and freedoms. Effective protection of these rights requires both a contextual framework and a framework that reflects the anti-disadvantage principle.
In Weinrib, I will praise the Court for trying to develop a section 1 test that is based on a unified understanding of the role of the Charter (and judicial review) in Canadian society. Unlike her, however, I believe that a more contextual framework can exist alongside this unified approach, one that tries to be sensitive to the needs of disadvantaged groups in society.41
In part I of this article, I will discuss the relatively non-contextual formulation embedded in the Oakes test but show how its application has always reflected some contextual considerations. In part ii, I will discuss the contextual approach that has been developed in the United States and suggest how it might be modified better to fit the Canadian experience. In part in, I will discuss the Irwin Toy framework, which, I will argue, represents an appropriate articulation of the anti-disadvantage principle but is not sufficiently contextual. I will finally look at Keegstra, which combines both universal and contextual elements. Weinrib, I will praise the Court for trying to develop a section 1 test that is based on a unified understanding of the role of the Charter (and judicial review) in Canadian society. Unlike her, however, I believe that a more contextual framework can exist alongside this unified approach, one that tries to be sensitive to the needs of disadvantaged groups in society.41
In part I of this article, I will discuss the relatively non-contextual formulation embedded in the Oakes test but show how its application has always reflected some contextual considerations. In part ii, I will discuss the contextual approach that has been developed in the United States and suggest how it might be modified better to fit the Canadian experience. In part in, I will discuss the Irwin Toy framework, which, I will argue, represents an appropriate articulation of the anti-disadvantage principle but is not sufficiently contextual. I will finally look at Keegstra, which combines both universal and contextual elements. To establish that a limit is reasonable and demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society, two central criteria must be satisfied. First, the objective, which 41 Supra note 5, 509-10 (criticizing Chief Justice Dickson for deviating from the Oakes formula to 'forward the interests of the economically disadvantaged'). 42 Supra note 1, section 1. In addition, numerous substantive provisions contain their own built-in limitations. Sections 6-9 have limitations relating to 'reasonable residency requirements,' 'principles of fundamental justice,' 'unreasonableness,' and 'arbitrariness.' In addition, section 15 contains an explicit exception for laws, programs, or activities that have as their object the 'amelioration of conditions of disadvantaged individuals or groups.' Although I will refer to these limitations or exceptions later in this article, for now I will focus on the umbrella limitation of section 1. I will eventually argue that a proper, contextual interpretation of section 1 will reflect the existence of these built-in limitations on substantive rights. 43 [1986] 1 SCR 103 the measures responsible for a limit on a Charter right or freedom are designed to serve, must be 'of sufficient importance to warrant overriding a constitutionally protected right or freedom.' ... It is necessary, at a minimum, that an objective relate to concerns which are pressing and substantial in a free and democratic society before it can be characterized as sufficiently important.
Second, once a sufficiently significant objective is recognized, then the party invoking s. 1 must show that the means chosen are reasonable and demonstrably justified.... There are, in my view, three important components of a proportionality test. First, the measures adopted must be carefully designed to achieve the objective in question.... In short, they must be rationally connected to the objective. Second, the means, even if rationally connected to the objective in this first sense, should impair 'as little as possible' the right or freedom in question. ... Third, there must be a proportionality between the effects of the measures which are responsible for limiting the Charter right or freedom, and the objective which has been identified as of 'sufficient importance.'44 Before assessing this framework, it is interesting to note how little it directly relates to the language of section 1. Section 1 refers to 'reasonable limits,' without specifying to whom a limit should be reasonable -the plaintiff, the government, society at large? Dickson interpreted the reasonability requirement to mean that the objective of the challenged legislation must be important and implies that that importance must be measured from the government's perspective.45 Dickson's inattention to the Charter's language was not, in itself, a fatal flaw; however, it makes it easier to argue that alternative interpretations might be preferable. Clearly, Dickson's framework was not the only plausible interpretation that flowed from the language of section 1.
I call Dickson's framework non-contextual because it purported to use exactly the same standard for considering all substantive infringements and tried to use objective standards like 'importance,' 'rationality,' and 'minimal impairment,' which rarely considered the subjective perspective of the plaintiff. The only place that contextuality explicitly came into the framework was through the third step of the proportionality test, where the effects of the infringements on the plaintiff were weighed against the desirability or importance of the objective underlying the challenged action or policy to the government. The third step of the proportionality test, however, has played an insignificant, explicit role in the cases. Despite this attempt to develop a single, relatively non-contextual standard, I will argue the measures responsible for a limit on a Charter right or freedom are designed to serve, must be 'of sufficient importance to warrant overriding a constitutionally protected right or freedom.' ... It is necessary, at a minimum, that an objective relate to concerns which are pressing and substantial in a free and democratic society before it can be characterized as sufficiently important.
I call Dickson's framework non-contextual because it purported to use exactly the same standard for considering all substantive infringements and tried to use objective standards like 'importance,' 'rationality,' and 'minimal impairment,' which rarely considered the subjective perspective of the plaintiff. The only place that contextuality explicitly came into the framework was through the third step of the proportionality test, where the effects of the infringements on the plaintiff were weighed against the desirability or importance of the objective underlying the challenged action or policy to the government. The third step of the proportionality test, however, has played an insignificant, explicit role in the cases. Despite this attempt to develop a single, relatively non-contextual standard, I will argue Dickson's application of the 'sufficient importance' test to the facts in Big M added some clarity to it. The first stated justification offered by the government was convenience and expediency -that it would be most practical to provide the day of rest as the one adhered to by the Christian majority.48 Dickson rejected this justification because: (1) is it based only on 'convenience and expediency' and (2) it was repugnant to the values underlying section 2 (that is, protection from majoritarian, religious coercion). The rejection of these arguments is interesting because Dickson superficially seemed to be saying that a government's objective to choose convenient and practical rules was not an objective of sufficient importance Dickson's application of the 'sufficient importance' test to the facts in Big M added some clarity to it. The first stated justification offered by the government was convenience and expediency -that it would be most practical to provide the day of rest as the one adhered to by the Christian majority.48 Dickson rejected this justification because: (1) is it based only on 'convenience and expediency' and (2) it was repugnant to the values underlying section 2 (that is, protection from majoritarian, religious coercion). The rejection of these arguments is interesting because Dickson superficially seemed to be saying that a government's objective to choose convenient and practical rules was not an objective of sufficient importance 46 [1985] to meet the section 1 test. He made this observation in an off-hand way by saying that the government's argument was 'only' an argument about convenience and expediency. As a non-contextual statement, it is a somewhat remarkable statement because one can imagine that convenience and expediency are very important values to the government. (An example will be forthcoming in the next paragraph.) I do not think that Dickson really meant to say that no arguments based on administrative convenience could pass the section 1 analysis.49 The administrative convenience argument was problematic because it relied on consideration of the needs and interests of the religious majority -a group that section 2(a) is supposed to forbid from imposing its views on others, in furtherance of the anti-disadvantage principle. I doubt that an argument about practicality would have been so clearly unconstitutional if the group that was being protected were not a religious majority. For example, what if the argument had been made that a uniform day of rest, which corresponded to the Christian day of rest, had been necessary in order to ease the child-care burdens of working parents who, I will assume, constitute a majority of the population? Would that argument have also been rejected because it 'only' corresponded to arguments of convenience and expediency of a majority group? I don't think so, because the protected group is no longer a religiously based majority and might even constitute a group that can be considered 'disadvantaged' despite its majority status.50 It is only through a contextual analysis of the importance of religious freedom coupled with an understanding of the importance of the anti-disadvantage principle that Dickson was readily able to conclude that expediency based on the needs of a religious majority was not an appropriate justification under section 1 when section 2(a) has been infringed. Thus, even in his first major section 1 discussion, Dickson implicitly saw the difficulties with a non-contextual section 1 argument. Although he spoke generally about administrative convenience arguments as not meeting the sufficient objectives test, he really had a more contextual picture coupled with an anti-disadvantage principle of which types of those arguments might be unacceptable when section 2(a) was being violated.51 49 Professor Weinrib seems to believe that Dickson did mean to dismiss all convenience and expediency arguments, except for emergencies. See supra note 5, 500-2. 50 The group might be disadvantaged because of the unavailability and high cost of child care in Canada, which puts an enormous strain on families where the parent or parents are working outside the home. 51 Dickson's rejection of the second offered justification also adds more insight into the meaning of the section 1 test. The government argued that the statute could be justified by the need to provide everyone with a universal day of rest. He rejected thatjustification not because it was not sufficiently important, but because it was not the actual motivation for the legislation.
to meet the section 1 test. He made this observation in an off-hand way by saying that the government's argument was 'only' an argument about convenience and expediency. As a non-contextual statement, it is a somewhat remarkable statement because one can imagine that convenience and expediency are very important values to the government. (An example will be forthcoming in the next paragraph.) I do not think that Dickson really meant to say that no arguments based on administrative convenience could pass the section 1 analysis.49 The administrative convenience argument was problematic because it relied on consideration of the needs and interests of the religious majority -a group that section 2(a) is supposed to forbid from imposing its views on others, in furtherance of the anti-disadvantage principle. I doubt that an argument about practicality would have been so clearly unconstitutional if the group that was being protected were not a religious majority. For example, what if the argument had been made that a uniform day of rest, which corresponded to the Christian day of rest, had been necessary in order to ease the child-care burdens of working parents who, I will assume, constitute a majority of the population? Would that argument have also been rejected because it 'only' corresponded to arguments of convenience and expediency of a majority group? I don't think so, because the protected group is no longer a religiously based majority and might even constitute a group that can be considered 'disadvantaged' despite its majority status.50 It is only through a contextual analysis of the importance of religious freedom coupled with an understanding of the importance of the anti-disadvantage principle that Dickson was readily able to conclude that expediency based on the needs of a religious majority was not an appropriate justification under section 1 when section 2(a) has been infringed. Thus, even in his first major section 1 discussion, Dickson implicitly saw the difficulties with a non-contextual section 1 argument. Although he spoke generally about administrative convenience arguments as not meeting the sufficient objectives test, he really had a more contextual picture coupled with an anti-disadvantage principle of which types of those arguments might be unacceptable when section 2(a) was being violated.51 Notice that Lamer is not throwing out expediency arguments generally for all substantive provisions. Instead, he is throwing out the possibility of incarcerating someone for those reasons. From a contextual perspective, I interpret Lamer as saying that the core of section 7 is to prevent breaches of a person's liberty or security of the person, of which incarceration is the most obvious example. Thus, we cannot allow an argument for expedient imprisonment to justify that kind of core infringement. An argument for expediency, for example, might justify the creation of rebuttable presumptions, which might make the criminal justice system more efficient without creating the risk of unjust imprisonment. It is only by understanding how the argument for convenience directly undermines a substantive right protected by the Charter that one can understand the illegitimacy of the purported justification. The justification is problematic not because it is based on an unimportant public objective -clearly, getting drunk drivers off the road is very important to public safety -but because the framework that it uses to achieve that result is illegitimate under the values established by that particular Charter provision. Notice that Lamer is not throwing out expediency arguments generally for all substantive provisions. Instead, he is throwing out the possibility of incarcerating someone for those reasons. From a contextual perspective, I interpret Lamer as saying that the core of section 7 is to prevent breaches of a person's liberty or security of the person, of which incarceration is the most obvious example. Thus, we cannot allow an argument for expedient imprisonment to justify that kind of core infringement. An argument for expediency, for example, might justify the creation of rebuttable presumptions, which might make the criminal justice system more efficient without creating the risk of unjust imprisonment. It is only by understanding how the argument for convenience directly undermines a substantive right protected by the Charter that one can understand the illegitimacy of the purported justification. The justification is problematic not because it is based on an unimportant public objective -clearly, getting drunk drivers off the road is very important to public safety -but because the framework that it uses to achieve that result is illegitimate under the values established by that particular Charter provision. An example may clarify this point. Let us assume that there has been a dramatic increase in the number of women who have been raped while walking along a particular stretch of a major downtown street between 10 p.m. on Friday night and 5 a.m. on Saturday mornings. The rapes have been exclusively committed by men who were walking alone on that stretch of the street. Let us assume that the federal government decides to create a statute whereby it is unlawful for a man to walk unaccompanied on those blocks unless he has been given a special permit.56 The statute would also require that signs be posted in all major languages in that area describing these requirements. A man who violates the statute would be absolutely liable and subject to possible imprisonment. I think it is clear that all members of the Court would say that the statute violates a man's section 7 rights. But could this statute be justified under section 1? Because the purpose of the statute is to protect women's security of the person, but the means chosen infringe some men's security of the person, I believe that it would be appropriate to say that the statute was justified under section 1. Why? Because the purpose of the statute was to protect rather than infringe one group's security of the person. Since protecting security of the person is a constitutionally enshrined right, such a purpose is legitimate under section 1 even when it results in a violation of another, more privileged, group's section 7 rights. I should emphasize that I am not making an absolute statement that one group's rights can be infringed for the sake of another group's rights. However, the rights of a more privileged group can be sacrificed, under some circumstances, for the rights of a less privileged group. Section 1 is the place to embed this universal principle in Charter analysis while being sensitive to the seriousness of and type of right being infringed.
Justice 
My reinterpretation of the B.C. Motor Vehicle Reference makes it more contextual but does not bring universal values into the analysis. I do believe, however, that the anti-disadvantage principle would work well here.
An example may clarify this point. Let us assume that there has been a dramatic increase in the number of women who have been raped while walking along a particular stretch of a major downtown street between 10 p.m. on Friday night and 5 a.m. on Saturday mornings. The rapes have been exclusively committed by men who were walking alone on that stretch of the street. Let us assume that the federal government decides to create a statute whereby it is unlawful for a man to walk unaccompanied on those blocks unless he has been given a special permit.56 The statute would also require that signs be posted in all major languages in that area describing these requirements. A man who violates the statute would be absolutely liable and subject to possible imprisonment. I think it is clear that all members of the Court would say that the statute violates a man's section 7 rights. But could this statute be justified under section 1? Because the purpose of the statute is to protect women's security of the person, but the means chosen infringe some men's security of the person, I believe that it would be appropriate to say that the statute was justified under section 1. Why? Because the purpose of the statute was to protect rather than infringe one group's security of the person. Since protecting security of the person is a constitutionally enshrined right, such a purpose is legitimate under section 1 even when it results in a violation of another, more privileged, group's section 7 rights. I should emphasize that I am not making an absolute statement that one group's rights can be infringed for the sake of another group's rights. However, the rights of a more privileged group can be sacrificed, under some circumstances, for the rights of a less privileged group. Section 1 is the place to embed this universal principle in Charter analysis while being sensitive to the seriousness of and type of right being infringed.
Justice rights protected by section 7 has been established, because of the special nature of the consideration of 'principles of fundamental justice' in section 7 analysis.58 Although I agree with Wilson that the justificatory scheme for section 7 should reflect section 7's fundamental purpose and scope of protection, I believe she has gone too far in suggesting that no section 1 analysis should occur when section 7 has been infringed; the application of the anti-disadvantage principle through section 1 analysis in a section 7 case could be very important. In sum, the courts need to move towards a more contextual approach in thinking about section 1, but the more contextual framework suggested byJustice Wilson is not the appropriate framework, because her framework failed to recognize that judicial activism may harm disadvantaged groups.
OAKES
The major formulation of the section 1 test occurred in the Oakes case. The respondent, David Oakes, had been charged with unlawful possession of a narcotic for the purpose of trafficking, contrary to the Narcotic Control Act. He challenged the statute for placing upon him the burden of proving that he was not in possession of the narcotic for the purpose of trafficking. This statutory presumption was found to violate section 11 (d) of the Charter, which was interpreted to require the government to prove each element beyond a reasonable doubt; a reverse onus provision violated that requirement.
Having Although Dickson tried to rely on two relatively objective standards -the importance of the objective underlying the statute and the statute's internal rationality -I believe that his conclusion could be more readily explained under a more contextual approach. The core purpose of section 11 (d) is to prevent people from being imprisoned, especially for substantial periods, without being given the presumption of innocence. Unless the government can provide evidence of exceptional circumstances that demand modification of this basic structure, then it must abide by these basic principles. I would expect the government to have to demonstrate that a national emergency existed which required easier incarceration than the Charter would permit. In the Oakes case, the government did not simply have the objective of curtailing drug trafficking; it had the more specific objective, which Dickson acknowledged, of curtailing drug trafficking by incarcerating nearly all people who were in possession of any quantity of drugs for substantial periods of time, without any direct evidence that the people incarcerated were, themselves, sellers of drugs. I do not see the government as providing any evidence concerning a national emergency that requires a response of easy incarceration of people in possession of small quantities of drugs.
In the United States, for example, there has been much publicity about the 'war on drugs,' with its emphasis on drug busts and incarceration. infringement of the substantive right therefore affected his conclusion about rationality.
Although Dickson tried to rely on two relatively objective standards -the importance of the objective underlying the statute and the statute's internal rationality -I believe that his conclusion could be more readily explained under a more contextual approach. The core purpose of section 11 (d) is to prevent people from being imprisoned, especially for substantial periods, without being given the presumption of innocence. Unless the government can provide evidence of exceptional circumstances that demand modification of this basic structure, then it must abide by these basic principles. I would expect the government to have to demonstrate that a national emergency existed which required easier incarceration than the Charter would permit. In the Oakes case, the government did not simply have the objective of curtailing drug trafficking; it had the more specific objective, which Dickson acknowledged, of curtailing drug trafficking by incarcerating nearly all people who were in possession of any quantity of drugs for substantial periods of time, without any direct evidence that the people incarcerated were, themselves, sellers of drugs. I do not see the government as providing any evidence concerning a national emergency that requires a response of easy incarceration of people in possession of small quantities of drugs.
In the United States, for example, there has been much publicity about the 'war on drugs,' with its emphasis on drug busts and incarceration. In sum, the Oakes decision tried to focus on objective issues such as the importance of the government's objective and the internal rationality of the statute. It only made passing reference to the appropriate contextual questions, although they do appear to have influenced the Court's judgment. POST Justice Wilson, by contrast, refused to apply the anti-disadvantage principle to invoke a more restrained level of scrutiny in Edwards Books. She insisted that the legislature must have a 'principled' approach that does not differentiate between the needs or interests of various groups in society.72 She was especially troubled by the fact that the legislature had distinguished between large and small retailers in imposing the Sunday closing requirement; Dickson had deferred to the legislature's right to make that decision. Wilson concluded that the legislature 'cannot decide to subordinate the freedom of religion of some members of the group to the objective of a common pause day and subordinate the common pause day to the freedom of religion of other members of the same group.'73 Wilson literally applied the Oakes test, which could always support judicial activism, whereas Dickson modified it with the application of the antidisadvantage principle, so that he could more contextually determine whether judicial activism was appropriate.
In sum, in the year preceding his retirement from the Court, Dickson was moving towards the overarching anti-disadvantage principle in order to make himself a more pragmatic activist. That move, I argue, made his framework more satisfactory than Wilson's, which presumed that judicial activism is always beneficial. Nevertheless, I believe that a more contextual consideration of the substantive right that was being considered would have made Dickson's framework even more sensitive to the importance of the substantive right that was being infringed. Possibly, such modification of Dickson's framework will occur under the leadership of Chief Justice Lamer. As we will see by consideration of the United States case law, such a move is possible without watering down substantive rights.
ii The US approach The us Constitution contains no umbrella, limitation clause.74 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court of the United States has created limitations for every constitutional, individual rights provision. I call the American approach more contextual than the Canadian framework, because it is more sensitive to the substantive right that has been infringed. In the free speech area, for example, two differentjustificatory schemes exist, depend- Justice Wilson, by contrast, refused to apply the anti-disadvantage principle to invoke a more restrained level of scrutiny in Edwards Books. She insisted that the legislature must have a 'principled' approach that does not differentiate between the needs or interests of various groups in society.72 She was especially troubled by the fact that the legislature had distinguished between large and small retailers in imposing the Sunday closing requirement; Dickson had deferred to the legislature's right to make that decision. Wilson concluded that the legislature 'cannot decide to subordinate the freedom of religion of some members of the group to the objective of a common pause day and subordinate the common pause day to the freedom of religion of other members of the same group.'73 Wilson literally applied the Oakes test, which could always support judicial activism, whereas Dickson modified it with the application of the antidisadvantage principle, so that he could more contextually determine whether judicial activism was appropriate.
ii The US approach The us Constitution contains no umbrella, limitation clause.74 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court of the United States has created limitations for every constitutional, individual rights provision. I call the American approach more contextual than the Canadian framework, because it is more sensitive to the substantive right that has been infringed. In the free speech area, for example, two differentjustificatory schemes exist, depend-72 Ibid. 73 Ibid. 74 The us Constitution does, like the Canadian Constitution, have some limitations built into substantive provisions. The fourth amendment refers to 'unreasonable' searches and seizures, as well as a 'probable cause' standard for warrants to search and seize property. The fifth and fourteenth amendments refer to exceptions relating to 'due process of law.' ing upon whether the challenged regulation is content-specific or contentneutral, despite the fact that the first amendment explicitly states that 'Congress shall make no law' infringing the freedoms of religion, speech, assembly, or petition.75 A content-specific infringement is considered to be a core infringement; the justificatory standard is therefore quite high. The regulation is unconstitutional unless the government can show that the message being suppressed poses a 'clear and present danger,'76 constitutes a defamatory falsehood,77 or is obscene.78 No explicit balancing occurs in this area; the regulation is presumptively invalid unless one of these clearly specified exceptions can be met. The second kind of infringement is subject to a balancing test, under which the court considers on a case-by-case basis whether the regulation unduly constricts the flow of information.79 The principles that underlie these first amendment cases are that less protection should be provided to communications 'which by their very utterance inflict injury,'80 or which do not contribute to the development of the truth.81 Free speech is considered to be such an important value that other arguments, except in the commercial speech area,82 can rarely justify an infringement. Thus, the us courts ask what kinds of justifications can be legitimate in the light of the importance that we place on freedom of speech. Since speech is central to the operation of the democratic process, speech that does not promote discovery of the truth or could cause injury to individuals who might want to participate in the democratic process can be regulated.
Absent from the us framework, however, is an overarching anti-disadvantage principle. The anti-injury and anti-falsehood principles, which emerged from a contextual interpretation of freedom of speech, could be combined with an anti-disadvantage principle. Such an overarching ing upon whether the challenged regulation is content-specific or contentneutral, despite the fact that the first amendment explicitly states that 'Congress shall make no law' infringing the freedoms of religion, speech, assembly, or petition.75 A content-specific infringement is considered to be a core infringement; the justificatory standard is therefore quite high. The regulation is unconstitutional unless the government can show that the message being suppressed poses a 'clear and present danger,'76 constitutes a defamatory falsehood,77 or is obscene.78 No explicit balancing occurs in this area; the regulation is presumptively invalid unless one of these clearly specified exceptions can be met. The second kind of infringement is subject to a balancing test, under which the court considers on a case-by-case basis whether the regulation unduly constricts the flow of information.79 The principles that underlie these first amendment cases are that less protection should be provided to communications 'which by their very utterance inflict injury,'80 or which do not contribute to the development of the truth.81 Free speech is considered to be such an important value that other arguments, except in the commercial speech area,82 can rarely justify an infringement. Thus, the us courts ask what kinds of justifications can be legitimate in the light of the importance that we place on freedom of speech. Since speech is central to the operation of the democratic process, speech that does not promote discovery of the truth or could cause injury to individuals who might want to participate in the democratic process can be regulated.
Absent from the us framework, however, is an overarching anti-disadvantage principle. The anti-injury and anti-falsehood principles, which emerged from a contextual interpretation of freedom of speech, could be combined with an anti-disadvantage principle. Such an overarching principle would make it easier for the courts to uphold statutes that try to regulate speech motivated by racial hatred or sexual subordination. At present, the United States courts rarely recognize an anti-disadvantage principle in considering whether regulation of pornography or racial speech should be permitted.83 The Supreme Court of Canada, by contrast, has been able to recognize an anti-disadvantage principle to uphold legislation that regulates racially derogatory speech. The Court has defined freedom of expression broadly so as not to carve certain kinds of expression out of it, such as libel, speech that incites dangerous activity, racial vilification, or pornography.84 However, by recognizing a form of the anti-disadvantage principle, they have been able to justify infringements of this kind of speech.85 This framework preserves a broad definition of the substantive rights while also giving the courts the case-by-case opportunity to justify an infringement when certain principles, which will themselves be constantly re-examined, have been established.86
As a second example from the United States, the justificatory framework developed in the equal protection area is also quite contextual. In this area of the law, the court has three differentjustificatory frameworks depending upon the basis on which discrimination has been alleged.87 The most stringent standard is applied to racial discrimination, where the government must demonstrate that the statute serves a compelling purpose and the means used are necessarily related to the achievement of the state Since the history of racial discrimination in the United States and Canada are different, the history of governmental suppression of speech may also be different. Thus, I want to underscore that it is important for contextual principles to develop that underlie the core of freedom of expression in Canada, that are sensitive to the Canadian Charter and history, rather than for us principles to be imported into the Canadian context. Nevertheless, it does seem, at this time, that the anti-injury and anti-falsehood principles are relevant to the Canadian experience and therefore might be applicable as core principles. My argument concerning the structure of Charter analysis goes to how these principles should be made a part of the Canadian Charter; the courts have apparently already indicated that these principles are relevant to Charter analysis, as I have shown above. 87 Another significant aspect of the us framework is the intent standard, which I will not discuss because it relates more to how the petitioner establishes a prima facie case of discrimination than to the structure of justification.
principle would make it easier for the courts to uphold statutes that try to regulate speech motivated by racial hatred or sexual subordination. At present, the United States courts rarely recognize an anti-disadvantage principle in considering whether regulation of pornography or racial speech should be permitted.83
The Supreme Court of Canada, by contrast, has been able to recognize an anti-disadvantage principle to uphold legislation that regulates racially derogatory speech. The Court has defined freedom of expression broadly so as not to carve certain kinds of expression out of it, such as libel, speech that incites dangerous activity, racial vilification, or pornography.84 However, by recognizing a form of the anti-disadvantage principle, they have been able to justify infringements of this kind of speech.85 This framework preserves a broad definition of the substantive rights while also giving the courts the case-by-case opportunity to justify an infringement when certain principles, which will themselves be constantly re-examined, have been established.86
purpose.88 A somewhat weaker standard applies to gender and alienage discrimination, where the government must demonstrate that the statute serves an important purpose and the means used are substantially related to the achievement of the state purpose.89 Finally, in all other areas, the government must demonstrate that the statute serves a legitimate purpose and the means used are rationally related to the achievement of the state purpose.9 The most stringent standard results in the invalidation of the legislation unless it is carefully tailored to serve a remedial purpose. The weakest standard permits most legislatively created distinctions. The intermediate standard is somewhat harder to predict but often permits justifications relating to biological differences between women and men or, in the case of alienage, to governmental security. This contextual approach flows from the premise that racial discrimination is the most significant form of discrimination, given the history of slavery in the United States. It also increasingly relies on the premise that we should strive to be a 'colour-blind' society so that discrimination against African-Americans is as significant as discrimination against CaucasianAmericans. Like the freedom of expression framework, then, it does try to reflect what in the equal protection area are considered to be the core values that deserve protection.
Given the different histories of discrimination in the United States and Canada, and the different conceptions of the nature of inequality embedded in the constitutions of the two countries, it would not be appropriate to import this particular contextual approach into the Canadian cases.9' purpose.88 A somewhat weaker standard applies to gender and alienage discrimination, where the government must demonstrate that the statute serves an important purpose and the means used are substantially related to the achievement of the state purpose.89 Finally, in all other areas, the government must demonstrate that the statute serves a legitimate purpose and the means used are rationally related to the achievement of the state purpose.9 The most stringent standard results in the invalidation of the legislation unless it is carefully tailored to serve a remedial purpose. The weakest standard permits most legislatively created distinctions. The intermediate standard is somewhat harder to predict but often permits justifications relating to biological differences between women and men or, in the case of alienage, to governmental security.
This contextual approach flows from the premise that racial discrimination is the most significant form of discrimination, given the history of slavery in the United States. It also increasingly relies on the premise that we should strive to be a 'colour-blind' society so that discrimination against African-Americans is as significant as discrimination against CaucasianAmericans. Like the freedom of expression framework, then, it does try to reflect what in the equal protection area are considered to be the core values that deserve protection.
Given the different histories of discrimination in the United States and Canada, and the different conceptions of the nature of inequality embedded in the constitutions of the two countries, it would not be appropriate to import this particular contextual approach into the Canadian cases.9' There is no reason to place race discrimination above gender discrimination in a hierarchical justificatory scheme in Canada. The Canadian case law, however, has begun to reflect how a contextualjustificatory scheme for the categories of discrimination is needed. For example, in McKinney v. University of Guelph,92 the Ontario Court of Appeals explicitly rejected the view that it should develop a differentjustificatory framework for age cases than other discrimination cases. Nevertheless, the court concluded that age discrimination through mandatory retirement was permissible because it made it possible to plan for faculty renewal and the necessary funding that is entailed. Such needs, which were established through questionable empirical data, supported an explicit age-based discrimination. The level of justification, in practice, seemed quite low, although the court purported to use the same standard as it would use for race or gender discrimination cases. The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, because it found that the university's actions were not government action that was subject to the Charter under section 32. Nevertheless, the Court did comment on the section 15 issue and generally agreed with the analysis put forth by the Court of Appeals.
Many people have suggested to me that by having the Canadian courts use more than one justificatory scheme, as do the us courts, that the Canadian courts would water down substantive rights. However, the McKinney case shows exactly the opposite problem. By having only one justificatory framework for all equality claims, the McKinney case has already watered down the justificatory framework for all equality claims. Under the McKinney analysis, for example, pregnant women who seek maternity leave could be automatically terminated to allow room for people who are more inclined to make a more permanent commitment to the workplace. The McKinney holding would be more acceptable if it had been limited to age discrimination cases rather than potentially applied across the board to other kinds of discrimination.93 In sum, I would suggest that a failure to allow contextual justifications for some kinds of equality infringements and not others runs the risk of the courts watering 92 [1986] The issue in the case was the constitutionality of the Quebec Consumer Protection Act, which prohibited television advertising directed at persons under the age of 13. After concluding that the statute violated section 2, since commercial speech is protected by section 2, the Court turned to its section 1 analysis.
Dickson, writing for a majority of a five-member Court,95 first concluded that the objective of regulating commercial advertising directed at children was a pressing and substantial objective. McIntyre, dissenting in the judgment, disagreed that sufficient empirical evidence had been put forth to demonstrate that children were in need of being protected from highly fictionalized TV advertising. The dispute between them seemed to be, in part, an empirical dispute about whether sufficient evidence had been put forth to establish that claim.
I The issue in the case was the constitutionality of the Quebec Consumer Protection Act, which prohibited television advertising directed at persons under the age of 13. After concluding that the statute violated section 2, since commercial speech is protected by section 2, the Court turned to its section 1 analysis.
I In category one, the legislature was mediating between the claims of competing groups.6 In addition, the government was often acting to protect vulnerable groups when it mediated such claims. In category two, the government was acting as the 'singular antagonist of the individual whose rights had been infringed.'97 It was not trying to protect vulnerable groups. Dickson suggested that it was more appropriate for the Court to be deferential in evaluating category one cases, especially when the government was acting on behalf of vulnerable groups, than in evaluating category two cases.
Although I agree with Dickson's underlying sensibility, I believe he provided an unnecessarily complicated distinction. It is very difficult to say when the government is mediating between two groups (category one) and when it is acting as the singular antagonist (category two). For example, when the government facilitates the incarceration of drug users, one could say that the government is mediating between two groups -drug users and people adversely affected by the drug trade -or one could say that the government is acting as the singular antagonist against drug users. It is somewhat easier, however, to assess when the government is acting to protect vulnerable groups. People adversely affected by the drug trade cannot probably be characterized as a vulnerable group (unless the government is acting to get drugs out of a particularly poor neighbourhood) so that it would be hard to characterize the government as having a protective purpose. It is therefore not necessary to create the two general categories, and then ask, within category one, whether the government's expression infringement. He deferred to the legislature not because he was overwhelmed with its post hoc and incomplete empirical evidence but because he sympathized with its perspective as an appropriate perspective, notwithstanding section 2. Application of the contextual, anti-injury principle, which has developed in the us case law for free speech purposes, would, I believe, have made Dickson's conclusion more justifiable. It would have clarified that it was a philosophical perspective, rather then empirical data, that compelled his conclusion, thereby making it more understandable. Thus, as I have said above, Dickson should have asked whether the legislative purpose was legitimate in the light of the substantive right that has been infringed, rather than whether the empirical evidence can demonstrate that the purpose is pressing and substantial. The next step of Dickson's framework -the proportionality test -did explicitly utilize the anti-disadvantage principle, although his analysis was somewhat difficult to follow. Dickson divided the cases into two general categories. In category one, the legislature was mediating between the claims of competing groups.6 In addition, the government was often acting to protect vulnerable groups when it mediated such claims. In category two, the government was acting as the 'singular antagonist of the individual whose rights had been infringed.'97 It was not trying to protect vulnerable groups. Dickson suggested that it was more appropriate for the Court to be deferential in evaluating category one cases, especially when the government was acting on behalf of vulnerable groups, than in evaluating category two cases.
Although I agree with Dickson's underlying sensibility, I believe he provided an unnecessarily complicated distinction. It is very difficult to say when the government is mediating between two groups (category one) and when it is acting as the singular antagonist (category two). For example, when the government facilitates the incarceration of drug users, one could say that the government is mediating between two groups -drug users and people adversely affected by the drug trade -or one could say that the government is acting as the singular antagonist against drug users. It is somewhat easier, however, to assess when the government is acting to protect vulnerable groups. People adversely affected by the drug trade cannot probably be characterized as a vulnerable group (unless the government is acting to get drugs out of a particularly poor neighbourhood) so that it would be hard to characterize the government as having a protective purpose. It is therefore not necessary to create the two general categories, and then ask, within category one, whether the government's purpose is to protect a vulnerable group. One could simply ask that question directly. Or, more appropriately, given the language of the Charter, one could ask whether the government's purpose is to assist a disadvantaged group.
In sum, Dickson's sensitivity to the interests of disadvantaged groups forced him to introduce an explicit anti-disadvantage principle into his section 1 analysis. It also seems apparent that this section 1 analysis became increasingly contextual although he resisted characterizing it in that way. Dickson first concluded that the provision violated section 2(b) of the Charter. He resisted the argument that certain kinds of speech, such as threats of violence, should be carved out of section 2. He then turned to section 1, where he used a framework much like the one that I propose in this article. First, he described the universal principles underlying section 1. Included in these values were 'the inherent dignity of the human purpose is to protect a vulnerable group. One could simply ask that question directly. Or, more appropriately, given the language of the Charter, one could ask whether the government's purpose is to assist a disadvantaged group.
In sum, Dickson's sensitivity to the interests of disadvantaged groups forced him to introduce an explicit anti-disadvantage principle into his section 1 analysis. It also seems apparent that this section 1 analysis became increasingly contextual although he resisted characterizing it in that way. "easier to justify than other infringements."'107 Thus, Dickson seemingly endorsed a sliding-scale approach to justifications where a lower level of justification would be needed in some cases. Rather than weaken section 2 generally by permitting low levels of justification in all cases, he preserved the strength of section 2 while also upholding the anti-disadvantage principle.
In the United States, as discussed above, the courts have achieved a similar result in some cases by creating different justificatory requirements for different categories of speech. Dickson, however, resisting the categorical approach, preferred a more fluid contextual approach. Thus, he stressed 'that in discussing the relationship between hate propaganda and freedom of expression values I do not wish to be taken as advocating an inflexible 'levels of scrutiny' categorization of expressive activity. ... To become transfixed with categorization schemes risks losing the advantage associated with this sensitive examination of free expression principles, and I would be loath to sanction such a result.'08
In sum, the Keegstra decision embodied a major step forward in the Court utilizing an anti-disadvantage and contextual approach to section 1 adjudication of a section 2 violation. Dickson, however, spoke only for a bare majority of the Court, a majority that has disappeared with the resignations of himself and Wilson. And unfortunately, other majorities, as exemplified by the McKinney decision, have not adopted such an approach.
IV Conclusion
The Canadian courts have appropriately resisted importing the entire us framework for resolving constitutional questions involving individual rights and freedoms into Canada. One good reason for not strictly following the us approach is that it does not sufficiently reflect the anti-disadvantage principle. The Supreme Court of Canada, in decisions written by former Chief Justice Dickson and former Justice Wilson in section 2 cases, has come increasingly to appreciate the importance of embodying the antidisadvantage principle and a contextual approach into its section 1 framework; I applaud that trend. As the Court turns to a new chapter under the leadership of ChiefJustice Lamer, I encourage it to extend that analysis to other sections of the Charter, such as section 15, and explore how such an approach could strengthen rather than water down individual rights when coupled with an anti-disadvantage principle.
"easier to justify than other infringements."'107 Thus, Dickson seemingly endorsed a sliding-scale approach to justifications where a lower level of justification would be needed in some cases. Rather than weaken section 2 generally by permitting low levels of justification in all cases, he preserved the strength of section 2 while also upholding the anti-disadvantage principle.
The Canadian courts have appropriately resisted importing the entire us framework for resolving constitutional questions involving individual rights and freedoms into Canada. One good reason for not strictly following the us approach is that it does not sufficiently reflect the anti-disadvantage principle. The Supreme Court of Canada, in decisions written by former Chief Justice Dickson and former Justice Wilson in section 2 cases, has come increasingly to appreciate the importance of embodying the antidisadvantage principle and a contextual approach into its section 1 framework; I applaud that trend. As the Court turns to a new chapter under the leadership of ChiefJustice Lamer, I encourage it to extend that analysis to other sections of the Charter, such as section 15, and explore how such an approach could strengthen rather than water down individual rights when coupled with an anti-disadvantage principle. create disadvantages for certain groups of people. I believe that it would be good for all of us to engage in discussions from that perspective. In addition, the courts would attempt to listen to more voices and be more particularized when making decisions. Because of the problem of exclusion from the political and legal process that disadvantaged groups face, an attempt to open up the discussion within cases would be beneficial to us as a society.ll3
Notice that I am arguing that all of us benefit from these changes, not simply disadvantaged peoples. Like Martha Minow,114 I believe that we should strive to understand in communitarian terms how we all benefit from protection of what are commonly considered individual rights. Thus, we as a community benefit from being able to understand the deaf child who has been provided with a sign-language interpreter because we can learn from what the child has to tell us about our world. The approach that I suggest should help us, as a community, come to articulate the communitarian benefits that result from an extension of individual rights rather than see those rights in only abstract and individualistic ways.
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In sum, I can only be confident that my proposed framework would be beneficial in dialogic terms. We might come to know each other better across our differences and strengthen our community base. 
